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RECOGNIZING AND ENFORCING STATE AND TRIBAL
JUDGMENTS: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
Hon. Richard E. Ransom, Hon. Christine Zuni, P.S. Deloria,
Robert N. Clinton, Robert Laurence, Nell Jessup Newton,
M.E. Occhialino, Jr.*
P. S. (Sam) Deloria: My name is Sam Deloria, and I'm director of
the American Indian Law Center. Today we are going to discuss issues
regarding full faith and credit between state and tribal court systems.
I would first like to introduce our distinguished panel. Ted Occhialino
teaches at the University of New Mexico School of Law. Nell Newton
teaches at American University Law School in Washington, D.C. The
Honorable Christine Zuni is an appellate court judge with the South-
western Intertribal Court of Appeals. The Honorable Richard E. Ran-
som is the chief justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court. Bob
Clinton teaches at the University of Iowa Law School and is associate
justice of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Appellate Court. And
Robert Laurence teaches at the University of Arkansas Law School.
Let me begin with a word of introduction. For a long time, we at
the American Indian Law Center have been interested in and concerned
about the growth and strengthening of tribal governmental institutions.
Tribal sovereignty is often talked about in the abstract, but people are
somewhat reluctant to deal with the practical issues that are involved
when sovereignty is actually exercised: the give and take that govern-
ments do all the time in their relationships with each other. We tried
to take the leadership a number of years ago in looking at some of
the practical issues involved in the inter-governmental relationship,
particularly in the executive and legislative branches of state and tribal
governments. What we're hoping to do in this discussion is to look at
some of the practical and political concerns in the governmental re-
lationship between the judicial branches. This is, in many respects, an
area that touches the lives of Indian people the most directly and
immediately, in the sense that it involves the day-to-day conduct of
business on- and off-reservation. Unless there are some pretty good
rules or pretty good guidelines, the ability of Indian people to do
* This feature is adapted from a roundtable convened to discuss issues regarding
full faith and credit between state and tribal court systems. It was held at the University
of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, N.M., on July 22, 1992. The discussion
was sponsored by the American Indian Law Center and was moderated by P.S. Deloria,
director of the center. - Ed.
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business - personal business, and business business - is affected by
how these issues are viewed. So it is of enormous practical importance
to tribal and state governments and to the future of these governments
that people understand these issues better. So with that, we'll ask
Professor Occhialino to begin.
M.E. (Ted) Occhialino, Jr.: The thirteen separate colonies needed a
cement to bring them together into a single nation. The Constitution
provides that cement in many forms. One is in Article IV, Section 1
of the Constitution.' That provision commands that "full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and
judicia[ proceedings of every other State." '2
Two things are fundamental to an understanding of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and our discussion. First, the constitutional com-
mand of full faith and credit only applies between states. The Con-
stitution requires that every state shall give deference to the proceedings
and acts "of every other State." One of the issues we confront today
is the question of how tribal governments and tribal courts fit within
the context of the constitutional provision, which addresses only def-
erence to and from states.
The second noteworthy point is that the Constitution commands
"full fith and credit" but it does not define what full faith and credit
is. Instead, the constitutional provision delegates responsibility to Con-
gress to define the meaning of "full faith and credit." Congress has
done so over a period of time in a series of statutes. The statute in
effect today provides that the judicial proceedings "of any State,
Territory or Possession of the United States" shall receive as much
deference "in every court within the United- States and its territories
and possessions" as those proceedings are given in the jurisdiction
that rendered them.3 Our discussion today is going to consider whether
tribal courts are courts of a "State, Territory or Possession." If they
are, their judgments are going to be given full faith and credit deference
by states and, in return, tribal courts are going to have to give deference
to state court judgments.
At one level the debate today may be about technicalities flowing
from hundred-year-old cases. But ultimately, after the dry historical
debate concludes, we surely will face a fundamental question of policy:
whether tribal governments are better off if they are treated as if they
were states, territories or possessions so that they get full faith and
credit for their courts' judgments. Stated differently, are tribal gov-
ernments worse off because, if their courts get full faith and credit,
1. U.S. CONsT. art. 4, § 1.
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
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they have to give it as well, and they might thereby lose some sover-
eignty.
The panel members will likely present several different views. There
will certainly be some support for the proposition that tribal govern-
ments should be treated as territories or possessions and, therefore,
their courts must give full faith and credit to state judgments and get
full faith and credit for their judgments in return. Other panelists
might assert that tribal court judgments are not entitled to full faith
and credit - that the words "territories and possessions" don't apply
to tribal governments and courts and that instead, tribal judgments
get and tribal courts give only the common law principle of comity.
To give comity is to give deference, but it is a doctrine of discretion,
not compulsion, and thus not as compelling as the deference required
by full faith and credit. At least one member of this panel will try to
have his cake and eat it too. He is likely to take the position that
tribal governments and their courts do get full faith and credit, but
maybe they don't have to give quite as much full faith and credit as
they get. That position he will call "asymmetric" full faith and credit.
As we debate these propositions today, I think the fundamental
question is not what is a territory or a possession for purposes of our
federal full faith and credit statute, but what is the appropriate role
of Indian governments and courts in the give and take of showing and
receiving deference for judgments.
Deloria: Let me offer a suggestion and a little refocusing, if I may.
Because of the preoccupation with the term "sovereignty" in Indian
Law, I would rather that we talk about whether people are trading
off flexibility, if they are accepting constraints in trying to arrive at a
particular accommodation. It is misleading to say that tribal govern-
ments, and state governments trade off sovereignty, because anything
tribes and states do is an act of sovereignty. If a sovereign enters into
an agreement with another government, in which the sovereign prom-
ises to do something in return for something done by the other
government, each side is promising to exercise its sovereignty in a
certain way. But the agreement itself is still an exercise of sovereignty.
There is an undue fear on the part of many people that if sovereignty
is not an absolute - like Superman without kryptonite in the universe
- then all is lost and something terrible will inevitably happen. This
fear constrains a lot of tribal people from sitting down and even
considering some of these things.
So with that, we have several people here who have very definite
opinions on this. First, I will ask Bob Clinton to remove his tribal
judge's hat and put his University of Iowa endowed chair hat on.
Robert N. Clinton: Sam, your point is well-taken. It cuts to the
core of what full faith and credit really is about. Full faith and credit
No. 1]
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defines how separate sovereign states, possessions or territories within
the Federal Union exercise the sovereignty which they have, in order
to accommodate other members of the Federal Union in enforcing
their judgments. In the Constitution, as Ted suggested, full faith and
credit is limited by the terms of Article IV only to states. Congress,
however, was given constititional authority to implement full faith
and credit obligations by statute.
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress has enacted some-
thing called the Full Faith and Credit Act, found at 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 4
4. The Full Faith and Credit Act provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal
of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal
exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said
attstation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so au-
thenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
For a fuller elaboration of Professor Clinton's views on the application of the Full
Faith and Credit Act to tribal courts and judgments, see Robert N. Clinton, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WnamLmE L. RE,. 841, 897-921 (1990). For
competing views, see Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian
Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589 (1990); William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories":
Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REv. 219 (1987); Fred Ragsdale,
Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L.
Ray. 133 (1977); John T. Moshier, Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law:
The Application of Full Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 801 (1981); Gorden K. Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State
Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985). See also Robert Laurence, Service of Process
and Execution of Judgment on Indian Reservations, 10 AMER. INDIAN L. Rav. 257
(1983) (discussing the related problem of reach of state power to serve process and
execute judgments).
In addition to the Full Faith and Credit Act, there are other specialized statutes that
specifically obligate the states to give full faith and credit to tribal actions or judgments
in certain specified situations. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act contains a
provision found in 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988) which obligates state courts to give full
faith and credit to tribal court judgments in certain child custody matters. See, e.g.,
Roman Nose v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 14141 (10th
Cir. 1992); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988). Indeed, in every
instance in which Congress directly has addressed the question of recognition of tribal
decrees and laws, it has expressly adopted the full faith and credit model. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1988) (stating that state courts exercising jurisdiction under Public
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/8
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Based on my reading of it, that act applies to Indian tribal judgments
and requires tribal courts both to get and to give full faith and credit.
Let me explain that point in a little more technical detail than we
have so far. The Act actually uses two phrases to describe the coverage
of the statute. The phrases are different depending upon whether we
are talking about the court that renders the judgment, the "rendering
court," or the court to which the judgment is taken for enforcement,
which I call the "enforcing court." The phrase used in section 1738
for the rendering court is this: the courts of "any state, territory or
possession." 5 The phrase used in the act for the enforcing court is
this: "every court within the United States.
' 6
In light of the language of that act, it seems to me that the question
for tribal courts is not whether they want to give full faith and credit
to state court judgments. To say that they do not have to give full
faith and credit as the enforcing court, the tribal court must conclude
under the language of the act that it is not a "court within the United
States" as that phrase is used in section 1738. 7 To my way of thinking
that is not a tenable argument. It is just not plausible because at the
time the act was adopted, Indian tribes were sovereign governments.
They may not then have had Western-style courts, but they were
sovereign governments. They later developed Western-style courts, and
these tribunals were courts; they were not administrative tribunals or
something else, as Bob Laurence seems to argue in his article. The
tribal courts conducted judicial proceedings of the type described in
the Act. Once tribes had Western-style courts conducting judicial
proceedings, they became "courts within the United States" within the
meaning of the Act. They were, therefore, obligated under the plain
language of the statute to extend full faith and credit to state court
judgments and, I might add, the judgments of other tribal courts.
The only remaining question, it seems to me, is not whether tribal
courts have to give full faith and credit - they do. The harder
interpretive question is whether tribal judgments get full faith and
credit in state and federal courts.
The question of whether tribal judgments are entitled to full faith
and credit is dependent on the other language in section 1738: whether
the tribal court is a court of "any state, territory or possession." The
Law 280 must give "full force and effect" to "tribal ordinance or custom"); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1725 (1988) ("The Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the State of
Maine shall give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each other.").
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tribal courts clearly are not courts of any "state." In 1855, however,
the Supreme Court ruled in a case called United States ex rel. Mackey
v. Coxe,' involving the courts of the Cherokee Nation, that for pur-
poses of another similar but not identical statute involving recognition
of the judicial acts of states, territories, or possessions (in this case
the appointment of fiduciaries) that the courts of the Cherokee Nation
were, in fact, courts of a "territory" and should be treated that way
under federal recognition statutes. A number of state courts have
followed Mackey, both in the full faith and credit context9 and in
8. :59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855). The statute in question in Mackey was Act of
June 24, 1812, ch. 106, § 11, 2 Stat. 755, 758, which provided for recognition by the
courts of the District of Columbia of fiduciary appointments by courts of other states
or territories. The language of the Act provided:
[I]t shall be lawful for any person or persons to whom letters testamentary
or of administration hath been or may hereafter be granted, by the proper
authority in any of the United States or the territories thereof, to maintain
any suit or action, and to prosecute and recover any claim in the [D]istrict
of Columbia, in the same manner as if the letters testamentary or admin-
istration had been granted ... in the ... [D]istrict.
Id. In his opinion for the Court in Mackey, Justice McLean ruled that the courts of
the Cherokee Nation were courts of a territory for purposes of this statute. His opinion
focused not on the origin of the sovereign power of the tribal court, but on its geographic
location as a territory within the United States. He said: "The Cherokee country, we
think, may be considered a territory of the United States within the [A]ct of 1812. In
no respect can it be considered a foreign [s]tate or territory, as it is within our jurisdiction
and subject to our laws." Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 104.
9. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Fin.
Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975); In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334
(Wash. 1976); Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897); see also Native Village
of Venetie v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that State of Alaska must
give full faith and credit to Alaskan village child custody proceedings if the village is
the succe;sor in interest to the aboriginal sovereignty of traditional aboriginal commu-
nity); Navajo Nation v. District Court, 624 F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that
full faith and credit required for tribal order under the full faith and credit provisions
of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988)); In re Adoption of
Jeremiah Holloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) (same); Chischilly v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing tribal law); Lyons
v. Lyons, 268 N.Y.S. 84 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (according full faith and credit to the traditional
Dead Feast of the Onondaga as a means of disposing of property alternatively to a will
for which later probate was sought in state court). But see Brown v. Babbitt Ford,
Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that tribal decrees entitled to comity but not
full faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
Perhaps the majority of. cases considering the problem of recognition of tribal
judgments opt for a comity approach, rather than full faith and credit. Most of those
cases are, in fact, very ill considered. Those cases which opt for the doctrine of comity
often suggest that full faith and credit does not apply to Indian tribal judgments,
frequently only citing the constitutional full faith and credit clause and ignoring the
scope of the Full Faith and Credit Act, which significantly expands the coverage of full
faith and credit. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App.
1976). Sometimes, however, the Full Faith and Credit Act is cited and the court hastily
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/8
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other contexts,' 0 where state laws or other federal laws refer to terri-
tories. These cases treat Indian Tribes as territories for various pur-
poses, mostly involving recognition of their sovereign actions by other
elements of the Federal Union.
If the courts follow Mackey, as I think they should (and as I think
the state courts are compelled to do as a matter of precedent), then
the courts must come to the conclusion that the tribes must be treated
as sovereign governments within the Federal Union; that is, they have
become part of the Union. The same cement which bound the states
together early on in the Constitution, through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution, now by statute interweaves the tribal
government into the fabric of the American government. It provides
a way in which the exercises of sovereign tribal courts can be recognized
as a matter of mandatory federal law by state courts. It leaves those
decisions, not finally to the state courts but, because full faith and
credit is a federal issue, to the federal courts. Additionally, it provides
a vehicle by which states can be assured of reciprocity and will know
concludes that tribes are not territories without ever citing Mackey. Sengstock v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (also published at 19 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 5026 (1991)). In other cases, full faith
and credit is never mentioned as an alternative form of recognition. See, e.g., Fredericks
v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990) (point-
edly ignoring full faith and credit despite a separate concurring opinion that suggested
that once tribes adopt procedural safeguards such as appellate courts there was no
reason not to extend full faith and credit to their judgments to promote tribal sover-
eignty). Only the New Mexico case of Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 527 P.2d 1222
(N.M. 1974) actually considers both the Full Faith and Credit Act and the implications
of the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, and concludes
nonetheless that tribal court judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit under
the Act. The court in Jim distinguished Mackey, simply suggesting "[t]hat case does
not control; it interpreted an entirely different statute." Jim, 527 P.2d at 1225.
10. See, e.g., Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that Navajo courts are courts of a territory for purposes of Arizona's version of the
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings); In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that Cherokee tribe is
a state for purposes of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1988)); DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989) (suggesting
in dicta that Indian tribal courts should be considered courts of a state for purposes of
the Parental Kidnapping Act); Martinez v. Superior Court, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that Indian reservations are territories or possessions of the United
States within the meaning of Arizona's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, AIz.
REv. STAT. §§ 8-401 to -424 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Red Lake Band of Chippewa v.
State, 248 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1976) (holding that Red Lake tribe was a state or territory
for purposes of a Minnesota motor vehicle statute that was premised on policy to
recognize the validity of automobile registration licenses issued by other jurisdictions);
Whitsett v. Forehand, 79 N.C. 230, 232 (1878) (holding that Cherokee Nation is a
territory for purposes of state statute governing admission of deed to probate and
registration).
No. 1]
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that if they accord tribal judgments full faith and credit, their valid
state judgments will, in turn, be enforced in tribal court.
I should say with respect both to tribal and to state judgments, that
they need not be enforced in two instances. First, under prevailing
rules, a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction need
not be enforced by any enforcing court. Of course, if the issue of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction was unsuccessfully litigated before the
rendering court, then it should not be relitigated again before the
enforcing court. Even for cases where the jurisdictional issue is first
heard in state court, federal protections exist through appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States against state courts exceeding
their jurisdiction over Indians or Indian country.
Second, no enforcement is required if there was a lack of personal
jurisdiction and there was no appearance in the initial action. There-
fore, tribal courts have reasons to decline enforcement of a state
judgment if it turns out that the state was overextending its power to
regulate reservation activities." The proper procedure is to recognize
the general obligation to accord state judgments full faith and credit
but to decline to enforce a judgment in any particular case on the
basis of the absence of subject matter or personal jurisdiction in the
rendering court.
Deloria: Bob, you're not arguing that when Congress passed section
1738, it intended to include Indians.
Clinton: No, I'm not arguing that directly. What I am arguing
instead is that Indian tribes certainly were' known as sovereigns in the
late eighteenth century when the Full Faith and Credit Act was debated
and adopted. Indian tribes, at that time, did not have Western-style
courts. But once they developed Western-style courts, they came within
the plain language of "every court within the United States." If you
think about it, California was not a state when the statute was first
passed. Indeed, at the time, California was held by Spain. Of course,
when California became a sovereign state within the Federal Union
and developed courts, it became subject to the act in quite the same
way. This is simply because the plain language of the act covered it,
11. Generally, a court is not required to accord full faith and credit to a judgment
rendered by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the
person ef the defendant, unless the defendant litigated these questions in the initial
forum and lost. See, e.g., Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). Since most principles of federal Indian law limiting the reach of state law in
Indian country are framed as limitations on the subject matter or personal jurisdiction
of state courts, Indian tribal autonomy generally is adequately protected by such
jurisdictional limitations. Where a state does legitimately exercise subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, often over off-reservation related causes of action, the tribes have
little excuse under the Full Faith and Credit Act and very few sustainable reasons for
declining to accord such state judgments full faith and credit.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/8
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even though Congress was not thinking about California when it
enacted the statute. Indian tribes are in exactly the same situation.
They were sovereign entities within the territory claimed by the United
States when the Act was adopted. When they later developed Western-
style courts they fell within the plain language of the statute which
covers for enforcing courts "every court within the United States"
and for rendering courts, the courts of "any state, territory or pos-
session."
Robert Laurence: Well, the Sioux tribes and California were not in
"exactly" the same situation. I think Congress when enacting
section 1738 may well have been anticipating that the courts of future
states would be covered by the statute, even without having California
specifically in mind. But it's another matter whether it was anticipating
future Westernized Indian tribal courts.
Deloria: It's easy enough to read the phrase "within the United
States" to show that Congress wished to include tribes. It's less easy
to read the phrase "state, territory and possession" language in that
way. But is it possible to just say for these purposes a tribe is like a
territory? Law professors and judges have to make certain assumptions
based on the material that is in front of them that the rest of us do
not have to make. Certainly, in terms of finding a way to read present
law to include tribes, your reading is plausible. Nevertheless, we should
look at whether that is the best way to achieve the result everybody
seeks: a manageable system of dealing with judgments between gov-
ernments. Professor Laurence of the state of Arkansas and its univer-
sity has a similar view.
Laurence: My view, the one that Ted alluded to as the "asymmetric"
one, is that full faith and credit as required between states by the
Constitution and statutes is not well-designed for the problem that
exists between states and tribes. Ted talked about the glue that holds
the Union together. It seems to me that full faith and credit is more
than just glue. In some ways, full faith and credit creates the Union
as we know it. What we call the "sisterhood" of states, is created by
the equality of states in full faith and credit, and - on the political
side - in the Senate. It seems to me those two clauses in the Consti-
tution in a very real way create the Union of fifty states that we live
in.
I am not at all sure that sisterhood is appropriate between states
and tribes. I guess if I had to state in just one sentence why I am not
sure it's appropriate, I'd say that New York is ten thousand times as
big as the San Juan Pueblo. And that's just in terms of population;
if we measured beyond population, in terms of economic power, the
disparity would, in fact, be quite much more than ten thousand times.
I think that the sisterhood that we have works very well among states,
even when the difference in size and clout is between, say, Florida
No. 1]
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and New Mexico. But I'm not so sure it works when you're dealing
with such disparity in the size and power of governmental units. Even
between the largest tribe and the smallest state, there is a quantum
difference in power.
I think, instead, we ought to take what we have in this country -
a wide variety of tribes in terms of their own sizes and strengths -
and we ought then to start from first principles. We ought to decide
just exactly what the problems are, what the concerns of tribal court
judges and state court judges are, and we ought to create a system
that responds to those concerns.
I think those concerns - the concerns of tribal court judges and
state court judges - are not the same. They're not identical. They're
asymmetric, and so the system that I propose to deal with the recog-
nition of judgments across reservation boundaries is asymmetric to
take care of that difference in problems.
Very quickly, I would say the main question that I perceive to exist
in the mind of a state court judge receiving a tribal court judgment
is whether the tribal court judgment was issued fairly and consistently
with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.12 As you know, there's no
federal court review for what went on at the tribal court level, at least
on the civil side where our primary concern lies. 3 The Indian Civil
Rights Act applies to tribal court proceedings, but there's no collateral
review, and there is no appeal outside the tribal court system. I think
the state court judge as the enforcing judge has a legitimate concern
about whether the judgment was rendered consistently with the defen-
dant's civil rights under the ICRA.
I think that's a concern that the state court judge doesn't have in
giving full faith and credit to a sister state judgment. The federal
courts do stand ready to review state court judgments, either on appeal
or collaterally. So I think the state court judge, as the judge asked to
enforce a tribal court judgment, has a concern that traditional, con-
stitutional and statutory full faith and credit between states doesn't
have to account for.
Similarly, but not identically, I think the tribal court judge has a
legitimate concern as the enforcing judge. The tribal court judge's
concern, I think, should not be whether the Constitution was followed
at the state court level, because there are federal courts to provide
that review. I think the real concern of the tribal court judge is whether
the substance of the law that gave rise to the judgment is seriously
inconsistent with local sensibilities and local tribal law. I would like
the tribal court judge to be permitted a re-inspection of the suit on
12. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
13. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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the merits, to look for that serious inconsistency with tribal ways
before the judge is made to enforce the state court judgment against
on-reservation property.
Notice that to re-inspect the merits is not to deny the validity of
the state court judgment. It only allows the tribal judge to decline to
enforce it against on-reservation property. Of course, we don't allow
that between sister states, but states and tribes are not - and never
have been - "sisters."
So, there in a nutshell is why I propose an asymmetric approach to
full faith and credit. I think the concerns of the two courts as enforcing
courts are not the same, and the system we propose ought to recognize
that. Now, I do not call my solution "full faith and credit," because
full faith and credit as found in the Constitution and statutory law
does not allow the system I have just proposed. I propose that tribal
court judges be allowed to do that which state court judges are not
allowed to do when enforcing other state judgments. And I propose
that state court judges receiving tribal court judgments should be
allowed to do things that they cannot do when receiving another state
court judgment. This is my asymmetric federal rule of recognition.
In order to have this system in place, I have to get section 1738 off
the table and show why it doesn't govern the situation. I concede at
the outset that I don't want it to cover the situation. I don't want
Congress to pass a full faith and credit statute that applies to all issues
and to all states and to all tribes. I hope they never do, for, as I've
said, traditional full faith and credit solves a different problem from
the one that obtains between states and tribes. And, I don't think
Congress has done so yet. I don't think there's much indication that
they intended to reach tribal courts with the language in section 1738
that Bob quotes. I don't think there's any indication that they were
addressing the issue of the reception of tribal court judgments when
they enacted section 1738.
Finally, I think that Mackey v. Coxe is wrong. I can't reverse it
myself, but I wouldn't extend it a millimeter without the present
Supreme Court telling me that it has to be extended to a broader
situation. (Actually, I wonder what the present Court would do with
section 1738. Bob's statutory construction strikes me as pretty Scalian,
actually, at least to the extent of saying that legislative history (which
is silent about Indians) is irrelevant if the statute (which says "courts
within the United States") is unambiguous. On the other hand, I don't
think for a second that the present Court thinks that tribal court
judgments ought to be entitled to full faith and credit.)
So that's the way I get section 1738 off the table in order to give
me the freedom to propose the law that I think we need.
Deloria: Both Bob Clinton and Bob Laurence are making semantic
arguments. In order to get around the problem that tribes are not
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states, 'Bob Clinton argues that Congress's use of the term "courts"
in section 1738 should be interpreted as including tribal courts and the
term "territories" should be interpreted as including tribes. He believes
that accepting this semantic argument is necessary before the nation
will issue membership cards to tribal courts as real courts. Bob Laur-
ence seeks to avoid the term "full faith and credit," because he believes
the term is freighted with connotations that are inappropriate for every
tribal court setting. So, he proposes an asymmetric rule of federal
recognition, a semantic mouthful that looks a whole lot like full faith
and credit except for the asymmetry.
Laurence: Wow. That's like saying that an airplane looks a whole
lot like a hotel, except it flies.
Deloria: Hold on. Perhaps there is another way to solve the problem
by analogy .to a well-established, though not well-articulated, theory
that has developed under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. The
ICRA listed rights using the same phrases as the Bill of Rights in the
United States Constitution. These rights serve as constraints on tribal
government. Almost immediately the theory arose that due process in
a tribal court situation might not mean the same thing as due process
in a federal court situation or a state court situation. Consequently,
the constitutional standards that apply to those governments may not
apply in the same way to tribes. With this analogy in mind, I ask Bob
Laurence whether there is a possibility that full faith and credit can
be extended either by argument or by another statute to tribal courts
to achieve the balanced asymmetry that you advocate. In other words,
full faith and credit need not mean the same thing in a tribal situation
as it means in an interstate situation. I think one of the fears you
have is the either-or problem with full faith and credit - either that
everything must be dealt with the same as in the interstate setting or
that any other solution will be lumped as "comity," which is not
binding on the states. Right? Isn't that what you're saying?
Laurence: Kind of, though I'd rather not use either term. They
bring along too much baggage from other areas of the law; it becomes
too easy for a judge to pull out the old non-Indian cases and use
them without thinking of how the rules should be different here. If
the rule is called "asymmetric full faith and credit" or "asymmetric
comity," I'm afraid the judge will say, "I know what that means"
and the asymmetric part will get lost.
Deloria: Let's get comity on the table. Nell, do the comity/full faith
and credit number.
Nell Jessup Newton: Comity is the name given to an approach to
enforcing foreign country judgments that the Supreme Court first
articulated in 1894 in Hilton v. Guyot.14 And every state, to my




knowledge, has adopted this same basic position: that a state of the
Union is not required to enforce a judgment rendered by a foreign
court. But, for the purposes of encouraging good relations between
the countries in the international sphere, states may choose to - and
in fact, should choose to - enforce these judgments as a matter of
comity. Comity is thus not mandatory, but it is regarded as more than
discretionary. In Hilton, the Court explained this in-between status of
comity as follows:
Comity in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and good
will upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. 5
In Hilton v. Guyot, a business sought to enforce in the United
States a judgment rendered in France. The defendant argued that the
French judgment should not be enforced because he did not receive a
fair trial in France. In particular, he argued that hearsay evidence was
improperly accepted by the French tribunal. If the doctrine of comity
required absolute similarity of legal rules and procedures, no court
would ever enforce any judgment of a foreign country.
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court adopted a presump-
tion in favor of enforcement of foreign country judgments. At the
same time, the Court noted situations in which enforcement would
not be proper. Courts applying comity as the basis for enforcement
have adopted several requirements as preconditions to enforcement.
These requirements are, first, the foreign court must have had subject
matter and personal jurisdiction. Did the court rendering the judgment
have the power to render the judgment against the defendant? The
second requirement is the foreign country judgment not have been
obtained by fraud. The third requirement is what I call the fundamental
fairness or fundamental due process requirement. Instead of requiring
absolute equivalence between the policies of the two states, the en-
forcing court should ask whether the judgment was issued by a system
administered in a fundamentally fair way and in which basic due
15. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164. Hilton was initially binding on the federal courts only
as a matter of federal common law; it did not bind the state courts. Given the broad
interpretation given the Erie doctrine, it is doubtful whether Hilton even binds the
federal courts in diversity cases. See Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws
§ 24.35, at 999-1001 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the impact of Hilton). Nevertheless, many
state courts have adopted the principle of the case.
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process was observed: an impartial judge, notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Once again, the doctrine of comity does not require the
enforcing court to inquire whether the rendering state has the same
court system. This requirement of basic fairness balances the respect
owed to a foreign state's judicial processes with the fairness to which
all persons coming before courts in the United States are entitled.
Moreover, this requirement acknowledges cultural differences, without
abandoning the basic principles espoused - although not always fol-
lowed -- by all states in the world.
The fourth exception is one that could swallow the whole rule. That
is whether enforcing the foreign country judgment would offend the
public policy of the enforcing state. Even in those jurisdictions in
which the public policy argument is accepted, the courts usually require
a situation in which the foreign judgment is based on a rule that
would just shock the conscience of the community in which enforce-
ment is sought. In other words, if the foreign country judgment was
based on a rule of law that is somewhat different from the rule of
law that would be applied in the receiving state, this dissimilarity
should never be sufficient. 6
The Hilton court also applied a principle of reciprocity as an alter-
native requirement for enforcement of foreign country judgments and,
in fact, refused to enforce the French judgment because France did
not enforce the judgments of United States courts automatically, but
instead permitted relitigation of the issues. This aspect of Hilton has
met with uniform disapproval from the international conflicts com-
munity and rightly so, for it punishes the individual for something she
has no control over - whether her own country will honor United
States judgments. Most states have rejected adding a reciprocity re-
quirement to comity. In fact, reciprocity is not included as a basis for
rejecting a foreign country judgment in either the major uniform act
on recognition of foreign country judgments or the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act of 196217 has been adopted by about twenty states.
In effect, the Act is patterned on the basic principle of Hilton; that
is, that enforcing states should recognize foreign country judgments
as long as the rendering court was an impartial tribunal with jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter that accorded the litigants due process in
proceedings free from fraud. To these basic Hilton requirements, the
16. See, e.g., Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 744-45 (N.Y. 1970)
("Recognition will not be withheld merely because the choice of law process in the
rendering jurisdiction applies a law at variance with that which would be applied under
New York choice of law principles.").




UFMJRA permits the party opposing enforcement to argue that the
rendering court was a seriously inconvenient forum. The drafters of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws have adopted similar,
although somewhat more restrictive, rules. 8 Like the UFMJRA, how-
ever, the Restatement contains no requirement of reciprocity.
Turning to comity as it applies to tribal court judgments, perhaps
a bare majority of the states that have dealt with the situation of
enforcing judgments of Indian tribes in state courts have adopted the
comity approach. 9 Some argue - and I ultimately perhaps come down
on this side of the argument - that if fairly applied, this approach
does give the enforcing state a chance to give great deference to tribal
court judgments. Comity also takes into account the many differences
among Indian tribes, especially in size and in the types of courts they
have.
A recent North Dakota case illustrates the way I would like to see
state courts apply the comity doctrine. Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann
Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc.20 began in the Fort Berthold tribal court
as a suit by the car dealer against a tribal member who had defaulted
on the first installment of his contract to purchase a pickup truck.
While the suit was pending, and in violation of a tribal repossession
law, the dealer repossessed the truck. The tribal court ruled the re-
possession illegal, and ordered both sides to file post-trial briefs re-
garding damages. The dealer argued he had not violated the law and
that, in any event, the tribe member had suffered no damages. The
tribal court disagreed, ordered the vehicle returned and assessed dam-
ages against the dealer. The dealer filed an appeal in the Intertribal
Court of Appeals, but sold the pickup truck before the brief was due.
At that point, the dealer simply failed to file the brief. The Intertribal
Court of Appeals upheld the order to return the vehicle and remanded
to the trial court. Upon remand, the trial court assessed punitive
damages in the amount of $15,000 in addition to the actual damages
suffered by the tribal member. The tribal member then sought en-
forcement in state court.
While noting there are differences between Indian tribes and foreign
nations, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the comity principle
as articulated in Hilton v. Guyot, stating, "We consider an 'Indian
nation' as equivalent to a 'foreign nation' to encourage reciprocal
18. The Restatement requires the foreign judgment be "valid" and that the im-
mediate parties and underlying cause of action be the same. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (1971). The definition of "valid" in the Restatement invokes
the principles of Hilton, however. Id. § 92.
19. See Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 741 (S.D. 1985) (collecting cases).
20. 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990).
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action by the Indian tribes in this state and, ultimately, to better
relations between the tribes and the State of North Dakota."' 21 Signif-
icantly, the North Dakota court rejected several grounds offered by
the dealer for refusing enforcement, including the difference between
the tribe's and the state's repossession statutes. In refusing to apply
the state's repossession statute, the tribal court judge had stated, "The
Tribal Code is not predicated on Anglo-Saxon concepts and Common
Law traditions." 22 The dealer argued this statement indicated a lack
of respect for North Dakota law that should be reflected by a refusal
to enforce the tribal court judgment. The North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed, stating: "This Court has held, however, that 'comity
does not rest upon mutuality or reciprocity.' ' 23 The court accordingly
refused to permit relitigation of such issues as whether the punitive
damages were appropriate. The supreme court acknowledged that it
would accept a public policy objection in an appropriate case, but
only if the tribal custom shocked the conscience of the court. 24 Noting
the tribal court had jurisdiction under its own laws over the subject
matter and the parties, and that there had been no allegation of fraud,
the supreme court overturned the lower court's decision denying sum-
mary judgment for the tribal member. In short, the opinion represents
not discretion run wild, but an appropriate deference to tribal courts.
In contrast, the criticism of the comity approach is that it seems
totally discretionary. In theory, a state court judge could just refuse
to enforce a tribal court judgment, by saying nothing more than, "We
don't have to, it's up to our discretion." Therefore, the comity ap-
proach might give overly broad license, arguably, to state court judges
to refuse to enforce tribal court judgments, especially if they began
using a broad public policy exception. My reading of the cases has
illustrated to me that the state court judges applying comity have
usually accorded deference to the tribal court judgment. In fact, they
have applied comity in a way very similar to the way they would apply
it if a judgment of France came before a state court. I have seen no
examples of arbitrariness or otherwise showing any lack of respect for
the tribal court systems.
That is the comity approach. In some ways I think that Bob Laur-
ence's position is a version of the comity position.
21. Id. at 167.
22. Id. at 169.
23. Id. (quoting Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 246 (N.D.
1980)).
24. Id. at 170. The tribal custom or law would have to be "so abhorrent to the
policy expressed in state law that it may not be given effect." Id. (quoting Mexican v.
Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 742 (S.D. 1985)).
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Laurence: I think so, too, with two additions. First, I'd still insist
on asymmetric comity. For example, I think that the state court judge
has much less reason to use your fourth exception than the tribal court
judge; very small tribal communities are more susceptible to being
unsettled by foreign judgments than are larger state communities.
Second, I'd make it a federal rule. I wouldn't leave it to the discretion
of the individual state or tribal judge. And, since it's a federal rule,
I would make a denial of recognition appealable from the state court
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Clinton: That problem ultimately is one of the major disagreements
I have with employing the comity approach to recognize tribal judg-
ments. Generally, comity is thought to be a matter of state, not federal,
law. The comity approach, therefore, when applied to tribal full faith
and credit questions leaves the state courts as the final arbiter of
whether to accord recognition to a tribal judgment. By contrast, full
faith and credit is a matter of federal statutory obligation and failure
of a state court to accord such recognition can be appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Now, Bob Laurence's suggestion that
we create a federal common law rule might partially solve that problem,
but at present we simply do not have such a federal common law rule.
I might add that I doubt that one will ever be adopted. For example,
just as enforcing Indian judgments raises questions of federal concern
involving Indians, enforcing the judgments of foreign nations raises
questions of international relations, also a matter of paramount federal
concern. Yet, under our present comity law we permit states to have
the final word as to whether they choose to enforce the judgment of
a foreign court. If federal law is reluctant to interfere with the sovereign
choices of states on the enforcement of judgments of another nation
- a question involving delicate questions of international relations -
I see little likelihood that the federal courts will adopt Bob Laurence's
suggestion that they fashion a federal comity rule simply because the
enforcement of tribal judgments involves a matter of significant federal
and tribal concern.
Thus, under present law, adopting a classic comity approach leaves
the matter of the enforcement of tribal judgments entirely to the state
courts. That always has been the critical difference between comity
and full faith and credit. The full faith and credit doctrine is a matter
of federal statutory obligation. It, therefore, leaves in the hands of
the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, the question
of orchestrating tribal-state as well as state-state relationships. Leaving
such matters to comity approaches in the present legal context is to
leave the final resolution of such questions to the discretion of the
state courts, where I assert they do not belong.
Newton: If a state court misused the comity approach, by inter-
preting it too broadly in some of the ways I have discussed, the tribe
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could appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing it is an
appealable matter of federal common law governing the extent to
which states must give deference to tribal court judgments. In that
appeal, I would urge the Supreme Court to adopt comity, strictly
interpreted, as the rule.
I understand Bob's argument that enforcement of judgments is
regarded by most sages as a state law matter in the Erie sense and
even agree with this point in the context of enforcing international
judgments. But, I would distinguish the federal-state-tribal relationship
from the state-tribal-foreign country relationship. While federal control
of the field of foreign relations is broad, as it is in the field of Indian
law, the purpose of federal control in the international context is not
to protect foreign nations from the states, but to foster relations
between the United States and other nations. In other words, a state's
refusal to enforce a judgment from a tribunal in Paris can do little
danger to the French government or its relations with the United
States. In fact, if a state's consistent refusal to enforce French court
judgments on a flaky comity theory (e.g., "Any country that speaks
French and is rude to tourists doesn't deserve any respect in the great
state of Fredonia") posed any threat to this nation's relationship with
France, the executive and legislative branches would readily intervene.
In contrast, the federal government's supremacy in Indian affairs is
predicated in part on the federal government's historic obligation to
protect the tribes from the states. Because of the differentials in power
and wealth and usually in numbers of citizens and size as well; because
of their long history of enmity only recently reduced by efforts on
both sides to form better working relationships, the states have been
characterized as tribes' "greatest enemy."' z While a state court judg-
ment may not put the government of Paris into turmoil, a state court's
consistent refusal to enforce tribal court judgments on similar flaky
ground; undercuts the legitimacy of the tribal courts in a way directly
contrary to the present United States policy of fostering and strength-
ening tribal court systems and tribal governments. 26 Moreover, the
tribe's lack of political influence in the state legislatures and the fact
that a local state-tribal conflict may not readily get the ear of Congress,
should influence the Supreme Court to act more forcefully in this area
to protect the tribes from the states.27 In short, the Supreme Court
25. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
26. See, e.g., National Farmers Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
(relying on the importance of the federal policy of supporting tribal self-government in
requiring federal courts to permit tribal courts the first opportunity to determine the
extent of tribal court jurisdiction over civil matters).
27. The lack of representation of federal interests fostering interstate commerce in
state legislatures is a rationale frequently invoked for the Supreme Court's interventionist
stance in reviewing state regulations affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., South-
Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 n.2 (1945).
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need not decide that enforcement of foreign country judgments is a
matter of federal common law in order to declare Indian country
comity to be a rule of federal common law rule.
Furthermore, although many states have cited Hilton and used the
term "comity," I am aware of no state judicial decisions that say:
"that is a matter of internal state law only, not appealable." In short,
whether states actually take the position that federal law cannot control
in this area will not be resolved until a state refuses to recognize a
tribal court judgment, citing comity, and does so in an arbitrary way
by, for example, citing the differences between tribal and state law as
alone justifying refusal. At that point, if the plaintiff filed a writ of
certiorari, I would hope the Supreme Court would take the case and
give guidance to state courts on the appropriate boundaries of the
comity doctrine.
Clinton: I am a little concerned that, when all is said and done, we
are left without anyone here at this roundtable articulating and de-
fending what is the predominate methodology of state courts in this
area: straight comity. I had thought that was Nell's position, but we
see now that she agrees with Bob Laurence and me on the need for
a federal rule. That position, of course, is not straight comity and is
not the rule that the states are developing on their own, nor is it the
one that the states would be expected to develop on their own. Thus,
the roundtable is perhaps, in the end, a bit misleading, without an
overt defender of classic comity holding a seat at the table.
Deloria: There's no way we're going to have an outcome that puts
the tribes within constitutional full faith and credit. So we are dis-
cussing a statutory or common law inclusion of tribal courts or tribal
governments in some other category. In both full faith and credit and
in comity, there is an existing set of rules that was developed to guide
courts in receiving foreign judgments. But these rules are based on the
assumption that they apply to large governments, large systems that
perceive themselves to be permanent. But tribes always perceived them-
selves to be threatened with extinction. So, it is in the interests of
nobody - this is a hypothesis - to have the same set of rules
uncritically applied to the tribal-state situation as those applied to the
interstate situation, or even the state-foreign country situation.
So, we have also discussed a separate set of rules suited to state-
tribal disparities, such as size. What is the state perspective? Why does
it matter, or does it matter, whether the process or rule is called full
faith and credit or whether it is called comity? Does it matter to you,
Chief Justice Ransom? It matters in the sense that one set of rules -
the full faith and credit rules - gives you less flexibility than the
other. Right?
Richard E. Ransom: I don't like either full faith and credit or
comity, quite frankly. I think we're attempting to walk in shoes that
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were never really made for this trek. We need a fresh approach,
probably legislative. But, in the absence of legislation and perhaps as
a prelude to legislation, we should try various judicial experiments in
new doctrine.
The United States Senate has legislation pending that has been under
a great deal of scrutiny, with a number of hearings, regarding the
support of tribal courts. One of the provisions in what was Senate
Bill 1752 of the 102d Congress - which was never passed - provided
for full faith and credit between states and tribes. I'm on a standing
committee of the Conference of Chief Justices that deals with Indian
sovereignty and Indian courts, and the relationship between those
courts and the courts of the states. The Conference of Chief Justices
has gone on record against using the term "full faith and credit" with
respect to enforcing the final judgments (or otherwise enforceable
orders) of tribal courts in the state domain.
I believe the reason most of the chief justices of the United ,States
are against using that phrase is that it is simply not a phrase that was
designed for this situation. We are talking about Indian tribes and
tribal courts. Why, I've heard there are Indian tribes that don't have
more than a single enrolled member. I know that there are a number
of tribes that don't have more than a half dozen, or at least no more
than a score, of enrolled members. I suppose that, in some of those
situations, the executive and the judiciary and the legislative functions
are all mixed up together in one person or a half a dozen.
This doesn't necessarily bother me with respect to whether we might
enforce the judicial acts of that body, but it raises the question of
what is an Indian tribe? What are we talking about? To what tribal
judgments are we going to give full faith and credit for enforcement
in the courts of the state?
And what is a tribal court? There are tribes that now have what we
would call "traditional" Western courts, following the practices and
procedures that we commonly see in courts within the states, with trial
courts and intermediate and final high courts of appeal. But then there
are other well-established Indian tribes still operating with the "tra-
ditional" Indian court system, a mediation system that brings together
the leaders of the clans, the parties that are concerned, and perhaps
the governor of the tribe, with none of the earmarks of a "traditional"
Western court.
So we in the Conference of Chief Justices believe that it's inappro-
priate to talk about a constitutional doctrine or even a federal doctrine
of full faith and credit. That doctrine deals with different types of
entities than we're talking about here. There are some Indian tribes
that could fit very well in a standard litigation system, but I'm talking
now about trying to find a concept that covers all situations. It simply
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is not appropriate to engraft all of the history and the application of
the doctrine of full faith and credit into this situation.
Comity also bothers me, because comity, indeed, leaves to the
discretion of the court the enforcement of a foreign judgment or
interlocutory order - a great deal of discretion. While I prefer comity
to full faith and credit, what I'm afraid of is that we're talking about
two trials every time we want to domesticate an Indian tribal court
judgment. We're going to have the parties contesting much more
strongly the questions of due process or jurisdiction, or all those
matters of public policy that Professor Newton brought up and which
we have already stated are important to us in terms of comity and
Indian jurisdiction. Those questions are going to be contested much
more strongly than the underlying issue.
So I would like to have the legislature, or perhaps the supreme court
of the state under its rulemaking power, develop criteria under which
certain tribes within the state will be granted enforcement of judgments
and other tribes will not. (We will be dealing mostly with the tribes
within our own state; not that we couldn't treat tribes that cross state
boundaries.) These criteria will not be established in each individual
case. They will have been established on appropriate application to
our supreme court by the Indian tribes. Once a tribe meets those
criteria, there won't be any dispute as to whether we are going to
enforce the warrants or decrees of the tribal court. Well, of course,
there can always be some jurisdictional issues or issues of fraud in
obtaining the judgment. Those issues come into play under traditional
full faith and credit. But aside from those issues, I foresee no major
problems.
I don't know what the criteria will be, and I hate to exclude any
"traditional" tribal court simply because it does not meet "traditional"
Western standards of practice and procedure. In fact, I am very much
in favor of recognizing very "traditional" tribal courts that have no
trappings of "traditional" Western courts. But I guess that will be
decided by those who determine what the criteria are for declaring
that the courts of a particular New Mexican tribe or pueblo are courts
whose orders will be recognized in the courts of our state.
Deloria: Let me see if I understand you right. You want to dis-
courage state trial judges in particular from developing separate criteria
of what they're going to recognize under some comity theory. From
the state point of view, at least, the state court system under the
leadership of the supreme court, should decide the criteria that would
then be good for that state court system, a set of criteria which would
then be applied to tribal court systems for the recognition problem.
Is that right?
Ransom: That's correct. I would do it either by a court rule, or
perhaps in the legislature. I think the legislature could delve into this
as well.
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Deloria: That's a separation of powers question under state law.
Ransom: It certainly is.
Deloria: Is your suggestion not, then, a form of comity with separate
rules that are suited to this particular situation?
Ransom: Is it a form of comity or is it a concept that must be
developed to meet a special need? Is it full faith and credit, or is it
something else? I just wish we didn't feel we had to use those terms.
Deloria: Is there a need for a new term?
Ransom: Well, if it's an act of the legislature, you can give the act
a name such as "The Enforcement of Tribal Court Judgments and
Orders Act" and then it would eventually have a short name.
Laurence: I agree with Chief Justice Ransom. I think that both
terms -- "full faith and credit" and "comity" - come with too much
baggage from the state-to-state or state-to-foreign country problem
attached to them. The term I use is a "rule of recognition" and I'm
just trying to do exactly what you're saying. We have to establish this
rule of recognition for the unique problems that exist between New
Mexico and its Indian tribes, or, like you say, the tribes outside the
state. I think the terms "full faith and credit" and "comity" imply
too much and we can use ...
Clinton: Let me say, that by suggesting that the problem is unique,
a proponent of such a unique, adapted rule is making certain assump-
tions about the differences between tribal and state sovereignty, and
possibly suggesting the lesser nature of tribal sovereignty than state
sovereignty. That is precisely what concerns me, and moves me toward
the full faith and credit model. Let me highlight the problems that I
am talking about.
Chief Justice Ransom is concerned about small tribes. Tribes, in
fact, might have just a few members. At least in my experience, those
tribes generally do not have a tribal court, or at least not a Western-
style tribal court.3 By its terms, the Full Faith and Credit Act only
requires deference to "judicial proceedings" and, consistent with my
interpretation, what "judicial proceedings" meant was what Congress
intended: a Western-style court. So, it is only to those tribes which
have adopted Western-style courts to which full faith and credit is
going to apply.
28. There are, of course, exceptions to the notion that smaller tribes have not
tended to fully organize around Western-style governing structures, including tribal
courts. For example, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the
Suquamish, who were then described in the opinion as having 50 on-reservation members,
had organized a Western-style court which unsuccessfully asserted criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. While exceptions to any statement of general tendency can certainly
be advanced, it nevertheless remains the case that it tends to be larger tribes, or those
with considerable resources, that have organized Western-style courts.
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Laurence: Would it be disruptive to note here that what we are all




Clinton: Now, that does not mean that there should not be some
other special body of recognition rules with respect to those tribes that
are continuing traditional systems. I do not have any problem with
adopting Judge Ransom's suggestion with respect to such nonjudicial
determinations by tribes. But if a tribe has Westernized in quite the
same way as the states, then it seems to me the tribe, just as much
as any state, is entitled to get - and, I might add, must give - full
faith and credit for their judgments.
The problem raised for me by the Chief Justice's suggestion of
individualized state recognition - and by the way, I am told that
South Dakota has already begun to do that, in other words, they have
already begun to implement Chief Justice Ransom's suggestion for
individualized implementation of recognition of tribal judgments under
South Dakota statutory law - is that it puts the states in the position
of deciding whether to recognize the sovereign governments and courts
of Indian tribes.
I have always assumed that under our Constitution, the recognition
of Indian tribes was lodged in the federal government, not in the
states, and that the choice to recognize or not is not one that the
states individually could make for separate and different tribes. Oth-
erwise we get a system of federally recognized tribes and then a separate
system of tribes that are recognized by the states for purposes of full
faith and credit. And that's a different list.
Newton: But, Bob, you can't really have any trouble with states
recognizing tribal sovereignty, can you? That's what tribes have been
striving for from the days of Worcester v. Georgia.29 What you mean,
I think, is that you don't want states showing less respect for tribal
sovereignty than the federal law allows. That's what Bob Laurence
and I mean about wanting this "rule of recognition" to be federal.
Chief Justice Ransom, for all the obvious reasons, prefers that it be
a matter of state law.
Clinton: Nell, I think that description of Cherokee Nation and
Worcester turns those venerable cases on their heads. They were not
about permitting states to separately recognize Indian tribes under state
law, as Chief Justice Ransom's proposal suggests. Rather, they were
about the refusal of the State of Georgia to give appropriate recog-
nition to the legal structure, sovereignty, laws, and lands of the
Cherokee Nation recognized and protected by federal constitutional,
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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statutory and treaty sources. These cases make my point. Federal law,
not state law, recognizes tribal governments and their governing insti-
tutions, like tribal courts. Just as the state courts were bound in
Worcester to respect the treaty and statutory protections accorded the
Cherokee Nation, so the state courts are bound by the federal Full
Faith and Credit Act and should not be at liberty, as Chief Justice
Ransom suggests, to fashion their own independent recognition scheme
for tribal courts. They are bound by federal recognition of the tribal
governments, often under the Indian Reorganization Act.
The last problem I have relates to Bob Laurence's suggestion of
what will go on before the state court which receives a tribal court
judgment for enforcement purposes. Bob's suggestion is that the tribal
court judgment can be reexamined in the state court when brought
there because of some "fairness" concerns. But, he says, state judg-
ments cannot be reexamined in tribal court on the same grounds. Now,
it seems to me that suggestion makes certain a priori disparaging
judgments about the sophistication, the nature of the exercise of
sovereignty, the quality of the tribal judges and the tribal courts which
I do not think are fair. We have good tribal judges and we have bad
tribal judges. Likewise, we have good state judges and we have bad
state judges. It seems to me when you take a judgment from a Western-
style court - and I think that's all we're talking about .here, when
we're talking about full faith and credit - when you take a judgment
from a Western-style court rendered by a judge, we do not inquire
into whether they're good or bad judges or whether they correctly or
incorrectly apply the law or whether they utilized procedures that
seemed meticulously proper or fair to the enforcing court so long as
they had proper jurisdiction. We take the judgment as we find it, so
long as there was subject matter jurisdiction, and so long as there was
either proper personal jurisdiction or waiver of that jurisdiction in the
earlier court.
Now, I would agree with Bob that, in fact, in full faith and credit
there ought to be an ability to inquire into whether the procedure was
fundamentally fair. But if we can't do that with state judgments -
and we cannot under present law - I do not think we ought to be
able to do it with tribal judgments either. Perhaps the one area on
which Bob Laurence and I would agree is that the rules of full faith
and credit should be altered to permit collateral attack on a judgment,
either offensively or defensively, where the judgment was rendered in
violation of constitutional or quasi-constitutional norms, whether those
norms are the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment or the Indian
Civil Rights Act. We simply do not presently have such opportunities
under full faith and credit and Bob and I differ, not on the desirability
of permitting such collateral attack, but, rather, on the conclusions
one draws from this significant omission from present law. Bob would
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No. 1] SPECIAL FEATURES
asymmetrically create such opportunities to collaterally attack tribal
judgments, but no other judgments, 0 while I would continue the
symmetry and accord the judgments of tribal courts the same respect
and enforcement that would be accorded to state courts. Perhaps
Bob's approach suggests a greater distrust of the procedural fairness
of tribal courts than of state courts. For myself, I am equally suspicious
of both.
Laurence: Well, first let me respond to the previous footnote.
3'
There. Now I note here in the text that we can and do collaterally
30. Professor Laurence has argued for an asymmetrical rule requiring states to
accord full faith and credit to tribal judgments, yet permitting tribal courts to ignore
state judgments. Such an approach not only seems inconsistent with the plain language
of the Full Faith and Credit Act, it also seems unsustainable in the long term. First,
most sovereign governments will be quite reluctant to accord full faith and credit to
judgments of another government which does not accord reciprocity. Thus, whatever
the legal doctrine, an asymmetrical rule is likely to be practically productive of a
disintegration of mutual sovereign deference. Second, an asymmetrical rule seems more
likely to produce intergovernmental friction, rather than to perform the intended role
of full faith and credit in cementing the Union together into an harmonious whole.
Third, depending on how such an asymmetrical rule is conceptually implemented, there
may only be federal oversight of compliance for one side of the equation, the state
courts. The mandatory nature of the legal obligation and federal oversight of compliance
with full faith and credit are perhaps the most important features that distinguish the
legal concept of full faith and credit from the more flexible, less mandatory doctrine
of intergovernmental comity. Fourth, as reflected by the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the area of extradition, see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Branstad,
483 U.S. 219 (1987), the Court has moved to a more appropriate and aggressive posture
in overseeing intergovernmental relations within the Federal Union as a matter of
enforceable federal legal imperative. Finally, the asymmetrical rule seems to attempt to
preserve a vision of tribal courts as remaining somehow outside the Federal Union or,
perhaps more accurately, with one foot in and one foot outside the Federal Union. Yet,
the current legal problems of Indian tribes and their contemporary legal situation suggests
that the long-term survival of tribal governments requires that tribes work out their
legal positions as governments that are now wholly within and part of the Federal
Union.
31. In the previous footnote, Bob Clinton paraphrases my position thusly: "Pro-
fessor Laurence has argued for an asymmetrical rule requiring states to accord full faith
and credit to tribal judgments, yet permitting tribal courts to ignore state judgments."
Wrong. I have argued for an asymmetric federal rule of recognition that imposes on
both courts the duty to comply with federal law. That federal law, though, allows the
two courts to undertake an examination of the judgment sought to be enforced and for
both courts to decline, in certain instances, to help the plaintiff collect its judgment.
Neither of these examinations is allowed under classic full faith and credit analysis, so
I don't use that term.
Now, those instances when the judgment is allowed, under my system, not to be
recognized are asymmetric, the state court is allowed an inquiry that is forbidden to
the tribal court, and vice versa. Neither court has to give "full faith and credit"; neither
court is allowed to "ignore" the judgment whose enforcement is sought. The state court
is allowed to undertake a "fairness" hearing, because it will be the first such hearing
outside of the tribal court system. The tribal court is allowed to undertake a hearing
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attack state judgments, but it's not done in the recognition process.
We now inquire as to the fundamental fairness of state court pro-
ceedings based upon the Constitution either on certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court or by collateral attack in U.S. district court, if you
can gel: around the federal court abstention doctrines. I'll admit that
those are very substantial barriers to actual review, but at least a
theoretical review of the fairness of the state court proceeding exists
outside of the state court system. But even theoretically, the possibility
of federal court review of tribal court systems doesn't exist. There's
no appeal from tribal court into the federal court system, and collateral
attack is impossible after the Martinez case, at least on the civil side.
Clinion: But what you're suggesting is only true if you have a
question that raises a federal issue. If the case only involves the far
more common situation of a misapplication of state law, the state
court is the final arbiter of that question. There is absolutely no
possibility of review by the United States Supreme Court, just as tribal
appellate courts serve as courts of last resort on most questions of
tribal law.
Laurence: My system is the same. With the state as the enforcing
court, I wouldn't allow it to reinspect issues of tribal law. And, of
course, the Constitution does not bind the tribe.32 So, I would only
allow a hearing with respect to compliance with the Indian Civil Rights
Act. Chief Justice Ransom makes a good point: We don't want to
have a major civil rights hearing for the enforcement of every tribal
court judgment. I assume that, at the beginning of the process, there
would be some rush to do that. But, as those hearings develop and
some law begins to be laid down about what exactly the Indian Civil
Rights Act means in this context, they should become rarer and more
manageable. We could encourage only serious challenges by making
the defendant - who is, after all, not paying voluntarily on a pre-
on the merits to see if the judgment represents a serious deviation from tribal law,
because the tribal society is more threatened by such foreign law intrusions than is the
state.
I propose this asymmetric solution because the problem, itself, is asymmetric. Partly
this is inherent, due to the degradation that tribes have suffeted under European rule.
Partly the asymmetry is created by the Martinez case, which prohibits a federal ICRA
inspection of the tribal proceeding. I grant that an asymmetric solution is cumbersome,
for the reasons that Bob Clinton has listed in the previous footnote. But one cannot
avoid this unwieldiness merely by pretending that the issues raised by tribal court
enforcement of state court orders are the same as the issues raised by state court
enforcement of tribal court orders. Sadly enough, for those who like their law straight-
forward, complicated and asymmetric problems require complicated and asymmetric
solutions. Or, as Tom Robbins reminds us, "Don't confuse symmetry with balance."
TOM ROBBINS, EVEN CowoILs GET THE BLuEs 375 (1976).
32. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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sumptively valid judgment - pay the costs of the ICRA hearing, if
the defendant loses and the judgment is enforced.
I'm not sure that I am satisfied with the Chief Justice's solution,
because it only has the state certifying on a tribe-by-tribe basis that a
tribal court system is generally worthy of respect. I think a tribal court
defendant who takes a judgment has a right to complain that the
system, which looks okay on paper, did not work fairly as to him.
Or her. Or it. In other words, I think each individual defendant trying
to resist the enforcement of a tribal court judgment against off-
reservation property has a right to raise non-trivial objections to the
tribal court process under the ICRA.
Deloria: I think there is, in some respects, an unseen hand that
works in this area. That is, if we try to adopt a broad rule that asks
too much of one government or another, we'll have to pay the price
some place else, either in people inventing messy rules to get around
the broad rule, or in paying an enormous political price by the
consequences. I think one of the things that's going to influence the
outcome here is whether there's an identifiable difference between the
kinds of judgments and orders and other paraphernalia that are brought
from state court into tribal court seeking enforcement and the kinds
of things that are brought from tribal court into state court.
Deloria: Judge Zuni, what's been your experience in both directions?
Christine Zuni: Well, before I answer that question, Sam, I want
to respond to what I've heard so far today. This is a complex issue,
one which requires further deliberation and consideration before I can
take a firm position. The discussion today has been very interesting.
I tend to agree with Chief Justice Ransom in his statement that there
is a need here for a third rule or a third approach. Full faith and
credit is a rule, as Professor Laurence was saying, to be applied to
sister states because there is uniformity among all the states. Sisterhood
and uniformity are not elements of the relationship between states and
Indian tribes. Indian tribes don't fit into the judicial uniformity that
exists between the sister states. Neither are tribes uniform among
themselves. Uniformity or conformity with state judicial systems should
not be a prerequisite to recognition of tribal court orders. Comity is
appropriate when you have foreign judgments or foreign decrees out-
side of the system entirely. Tribal court orders in my opinion don't
fit into either one of those categories. For the most part, when tribal
courts want to have their orders enforced, they go with the principle
of comity and that carries with it problems. It's difficult to accomplish.
I think it is best to devise a third approach to solve this problem
so that state court litigants can have their court orders enforced in
tribal jurisdictions and tribal court litigants can have their orders
enforced in state court jurisdictions.
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I question, however, whether solving the problem at the state level
is going to work, because there are tribes nationwide and our people
travel nationwide. You can have a need to enforce the decree of a
particular tribe not only in the state where that tribe is from, but
outside that state as well. And vice versa. So I see a need to try to
accomplish this through some method, nationally. Of course, I think
that working on it - at least looking at the problem on a state level
- is certainly a good approach and that needs to occur. We need a
thorough study of the problem of enforcement of judgments between
state and tribal courts on a national level.
In response to the question that you asked, Sam, about the types
of things I have seen: I have seen a judge, or some officer of the
state court or the state police officers from a border town come into
my court to request enforcement of an arrest warrant, or request that
the court allow the police officers to serve documents inside the
reservalion. The process generally followed requires that they bring
the papers to the court and then the court, upon looking the documents
over, would decide whether to give authority for service of the docu-
ments.
In situations where we wanted some documents served in the border
town, somewhat of the same process would occur in reverse. That's
generally how we accomplished service of documents. It's very informal
at this point.
I've also seen a case in which two parents disputing the custody of
a child initially brought an action in tribal court. However, one of
the parties fled the jurisdiction of the tribal court and went beyond
the state court's jurisdiction to the east coast, and we faced the problem
of our limited territorial jurisdiction. Nothing that we did in our court
was sufficient to reach the person, who was clearly under the juris-
diction of the tribe. So we invoked the state court's jurisdiction in
order to follow this person around.
The person didn't stop on the east coast, but went from there to
Oklahoma. So we had a situation involving a tribal court, a New
Mexico state court, a New York state court and an Oklahoma state
court. We were seeking assistance from the state courts based on an
underlying tribal court order. That is what really brought home to me
the problem that we face, because there is no uniform way of recog-
nizing tribal court decisions, nationally, other than comity. So, we
faced an action to domesticate a foreign decree in New York and
another action in Oklahoma before the case finally came back to New
Mexico.
So, there are tremendous problems that can arise even if you've got
one state which is working with the tribes within that state. You will
still run into problems if your tribal court order has to go beyond the
boundaries of the state that the tribe is in.
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Deloria: Well, let's take the New Mexico and New Mexico tribe
situation. Couldn't New Mexico serve as a sort of a "transformer"
then? You take a tribal court order, get it domesticated in New Mexico,
then have the New Mexico judgment enforced in New York or Okla-
homa under constitutional and statutory full faith and credit.
But could it go the other way, then? Rather than saying a tribe has
to have agreements with all fifty states, couldn't any other state come
to New Mexico, and, using the New Mexico courts and statutory full
faith and credit, transform in the other direction. The new New Mexico
judgment then could be taken onto the reservation, if New Mexico
and the tribe had an agreement.
Clinton: That would suggest just one thing that I would like to
bring up. Justice Ransom has talked about how the Supreme Court
of New Mexico might write some rules and determine whether or not
it will give deference to the judgments of a particular pueblo, for
example. He has not told us, however, whether or not he would
demand reciprocity as a precondition to applying that rule to a par-
ticular tribe. Before we talk about creating a new, specialized, and
presently nonexistent rule for recognition of tribal judgments in state
courts, we should find out whether the state is prepared to enforce
such judgments if they would not receive reciprocal enforcement of
their judgments in tribal courts, as they might not under Bob Laur-
ence's asymmetrical proposal.
Deloria: It also goes to Bob Clinton's point about the states rec-
ognizing tribes. As Felix Cohen is always so good at noting, the tribe
can also say: We don't care whether you recognize us or not. So it
does go both ways.
Occhialino: So, Justice Ransom, your notion is that the state su-
preme court or legislature might formulate these rules to recognize
judgments on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Would you expect, or even de-
mand, reciprocity so that the "transformer," as Sam calls it, works
both ways?
Ransom: I would need to know what objection the tribes have
before I could answer that. My experience has always been with
enforcement going one way: with the tribes wishing to serve a warrant
or writ (or any judicial act), to extend its jurisdiction outside of the
reservation. I don't have the experience the other way to be able to
answer that. I have read some literature regarding the fact that it is
rather typical to see reciprocity requirements enforced by states at-
tempting to negotiate with the tribes.
You see, I don't think I would say that it would be an absolute
prerequisite, but it may become a prerequisite when I hear from district
attorneys and others who are interested in enforcing various orders of
the court on the reservations.
Clinton: It is interesting that the Wisconsin legislation adopted to
implement full faith and credit and most of the other similar proposals
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I have seen do demand reciprocity.3 Reciprocal enforcement of state
33. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West. Supp. 1992) (as amended by 1991 Wis. Laws
990, act 43, 99 1-3)). The Wisconsin legislation states:
(1) The judicial records, orders and judgments of an Indian tribal court
in Wisconsin and acts of an Indian tribal legislative body shall have the
same full faith and credit in the courts of this state as do the acts, records,
order and judgments of any other governmental entity, if all of the
following conditions are met:
(a) The tribe which creates the tribal court and tribal legislative body
is organized under 25 USC §§ 461 to 479.
(b) The tribal documents are authenticated under sub. (2).
(c) The tribal court is a court of record.
(d) The tribal court judgment offered in evidence is a valid judgment.
(e) The tribal court certifies that it grants full faith and credit to
the judicial records, orders and judgments of the courts of this state and
to the acts of other governmental entities in this state.
(2) ...
(a) Copies of acts of a tribal legislative body shall be authenticated
by the certificate of the tribal chairperson and tribal secretary.
(b) Copies of records, orders and judgments of a tribal court of
record shall be authenticated by the attestation of the clerk of the court.
The seal, if any, of the court shall be affixed to the attestation.
(3) In determining whether a tribal court is a court of record, the circuit
court shall determine that:
(a) The court keeps a permanent record of its proceedings.
(b) Either a transcript or an electronic recording of the proceeding
at issue in the tribal courts is available.
(c) Final judgments of the court are reviewable by a superior court.
(d) The court has authority to enforce its own orders through con-
tempt proceedings.
(4) In determining whether a tribal court judgment is a valid judgment,
the circuit court on its own motion, or on the motion of a party, may
exumine the tribal court record to assure that:
(a) The tribal court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and over
the person named in the judgment.
(b) The judgment is final under the laws of the rendering court.
(c) The judgment is on the merits.
(d) The judgment was procured without fraud, duress or coercion.
(e) The judgment was procured in compliance with procedures re-
quired by the rendering court.
(f) The proceedings of the tribal court comply with the Indian civil
rights act of 1968 under 25 USC § 1301 to 1341.
(5) No lien or attachment based on a triable [sic] court judgment may
be filed, docketed or recorded in this state against the real or personal
property of any person unless the judgment has been given full faith and
credit by a circuit court under this section.
Id.
In 1992, the Oklahoma legislature also added a full faith and credit implementation
provision:
A. This act affirms the power of the Supreme Court of the State of
Oklahoma to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to the
records and judicial proceedings of any court of any federally recognized
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judgments by tribes, is regarded by most states as a necessary precon-
dition to state enforcement of tribal judgments, although such reci-
procity is lacking in Bob Laurence's proposal.
Laurence: My senior-most colleague at Arkansas, the great conflicts
scholar Robert A. Leflar, believes, in the non-Indian context, that
retaliation is not a concept that advances our inquiry very much: "The
doctrine [of retaliation] has received scant approval from commenta-
tors .... It has no appreciable tendency to induce a change in the
foreign nation's law."34 And, of course, retaliation is just the other
side of the reciprocity coin: "Recognize us or, by God, we'll withdraw
recognition from you."
35
These disputes can become too bitter and divisive; there's also a bit
of the schoolyard polemic to it: "If I can't come to your party, you
can't come to mine!" Under my proposed federal rule of recognition,
one government would not be relieved of its obligation to follow the
federal law just because the other government is not following it. In
a state-tribal negotiation, reciprocity might well be an issue, but I
wouldn't say it's a "necessary precondition," as Bob put it. We should
remember that the primary beneficiaries of the rules that we are
discussing are not the governments themselves, but plaintiffs with
judgments against defendants who are not paying voluntarily.
And finally, back to my boring insistence on asymmetry: if we do
demand reciprocity, remember that, in my view, no one should be
Indian nation, tribe, band or political subdivision thereof, including courts
of Indian offenses.
B. In issuing any such standard the Supreme Court of the State of
Oklahoma may extend such recognition in whole or in part to such type
or types of judgments of the tribal courts as it deems appropriate where
tribal courts agree to grant reciprocity of judgments of the courts of the
State of Oklahoma in such tribal courts.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 728 (Supp. 1992); see also N.D. CEr. CODE § 27-01-09 (1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (1992).
34. ROBERT A. LEF-A ET AL., AMEIUCM CoNrucTs LAW 250 (4th ed. 1986).
35. A South Dakota comity statute requires retaliation:
(2) If a court is satisfied that all of the foregoing conditions exist, the
court may recognize the tribal court order or judgment in any of the
following circumstances:
(b) In any case in which the jurisdiction issuing the order or judg-
ment also grants comity to orders and judgments of the South Dakota
courts ....
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-1-25(2)(b) (1992). This statute was recently at issue in Red Fox
v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993). The Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld
the trial court's dismissal of the enforcement action brought by Ms. Red Fox on the
grounds that she did not carry her burden of proof that the tribal court judgment
sought to be enforced was supported by proper tribal jurisdiction.
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looking for "mirror image" reciprocity. One government may agree
to do something in response to the other's agreement to do something
else.
Clinton: I want to go back to Judge Zuni's child custody example
for a moment, because the example makes the full faith and credit
point very well. The reason why there were problems tracking down
this individual and enforcing the judgment is that some of those states
were not, under the Parental Kidnapping Act,36 prepared to give the
tribal court order full faith and credit. If state courts had been prepared
to give the tribal court order full faith and credit, as they are required
to do under the Parental Kidnapping Act, 37 the tribe and the parent
would not have to go through the state. You simply take the tribal
court order to wherever you find the child and say to that state's
court: "Enforce this order as matter of federal law. This order is
entitled to full faith and credit." There is, in fact, one case from the
Fourth Circuit which holds that for purposes of the Parental Kidnap-
ping Act - which is the very act addressed to the problem Judge
Zuni is talking about - that an Indian tribe should be considered a
court of a state for purposes of enforcing the act.3" Now, if that's the
case, full faith and credit provides that very direct contact glue that
Ted was talking about, rather than the more circuitous route of the
Chief Justice's "transformer," where a plaintiff has to work through
the state in which the reservation lies.
Zuni: Let me just interject to say that in the case that I was
mentioning, neither the Uniform Child Custody Enforcement Act nor
the Parental Kidnapping Act was applicable for reasons that are not
relevant here. So those statutes don't solve all the problems.
Laurence: I agree in theory that full-blown statutory full faith and
credit may work for some issues and between some states and some
tribes. I resist, though, the congressional statutes which, in a blanket
way, apply it to everything. Hence my dislike for Bob's reading of
section 1738. If Congress sits down and says that parental kidnapping
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). The Parental Kidnapping Act requires other states
to enforce the child custody orders of the child's home state so long as that court had
jurisdiction and certain other requirements specified in the Act. Under section 1738A(b)(8)
(1988) the statutory term "State" is defined to include "a territory or possession of the
United States." Thus, the approach of United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, advanced
here to support the application of the Full Faith and Credit Act to tribal courts would
apply equally well to treating tribes as states for purposes of the Parental Kidnapping
Act. At least one court already has so found. In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Cherokee tribe is a state for purposes of the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)); see also DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court,
874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989) (suggesting in dicta that Indian tribal courts should be
considered courts of a state for purposes of the Parental Kidnapping Act).
37. See supra note 33.
38. Larch, 872 F.2d at 68.
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is the situation which, for these certain reasons, requires full faith and
credit, that seems to me to be a sensible decision.
Newton: Just as Congress can provide that for purposes of this
particular act a tribe will be considered the same as a state. The tribe
will be treated as a state for those statutory purposes, but it does not
make the tribe a state for all purposes.
Deloria: In our experience in dealing with state-tribal relations, we
have found that very often in the early stages the two governments
deal in the abstract, contending for power for the sake of power;
jurisdiction for the sake of jurisdiction.
When they get down to talking about reasons, talking about stan-
dards and particular issues, they then realize that they have achieved
an intergovernmental relationship that was more familiar. I think if
you put to Chief Justice Ransom or anybody representing a tribal
government, the abstract question of whether they would insist on
reciprocity, they certainly would not want to say, "No, we don't
care." Because clearly, you do not want to say I am going to give
you whatever you want and I do not care whether you give anything
in return. But it depends on the situation. I would guess that if you
took the approach you have been discussing, whatever standards you
developed, there can still be conflicts. For example, a tribe could take
the position that: "we want our judgments recognized but under no
circumstances will we ever recognize any piece of paper that comes
out of the state of New Mexico." Such a stance would somewhat
release the state from the recognition, I would guess. And I think, by
the same token, we get to the question of does reciprocity mean
uncritical, blind, dollar-for-dollar, penny-for-penny, chip-for-chip rec-
iprocity. And I hear you saying, "No, not necessarily. It depends on
the circumstances."
Ransom: It might even depend upon the nature of the writ involved.
There may be some issues, or certain types of writs for which I would
think the tribes would be very happy from past experience to lend the
enforcement power of tribal government. And there may be others
that have given rise to certain problems for which they would like to
reserve judgment.
Professor Clinton was asserting that full faith and credit would be
the answer to the problem that Judge Zuni raised, but yet how does
the New York court know that this tribal court is a "traditional"
Western court entitled to full faith and credit? Are they on some
register somewhere?
Occhialino: I find that ironic - not the Chief Justice's last obser-
vation, but the point it addresses. I started out today thinking that
Bob Clinton's full faith and credit approach at least had the benefit
of simplicity. But then he said it depends on whether the tribal
judgment really came from a Westernized judicial proceeding and of
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course, that is a tribe-by-tribe determination. So all Professor Clinton
has done is tell us that there is going to be full faith and credit, but
there's a black hole exception for "non-Westernized" proceedings and
that exception is as big as Laurence's "asymmetry."
Clinton: But it is very clear whether the tribunal that renders a tribal
judgment purports to be a court entertaining a judicial proceeding or
a tribal council or other governing mechanism. Most tribes have written
constitutions and tribal ordinances that can be consulted on such
questions. If there are no positive, written governing documents estab-
lishing a Western-style court, in all likelihood the judgment was ren-
dered through a more traditional nonjudicial governing process. There
is no greater problem for a state court in determining whether a tribal
decision was rendered in a Western-style "judicial proceeding" than
determining whether a foreign judgment rendered, for example, by the
courts of Saudi Arabia was rendered by a court of competent juris-
diction employing fundamentally fair procedures. State courts perform
the latter function all the time (often without easy access to the laws
of the foreign nation in question) under the guise of the comity
doctrine. There is no reason why state and federal courts cannot
determine with relative clarity and ease whether a tribal decision was
rendered in a Western-style "judicial proceeding" as required for
enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Act. The limitation I am
proposing is not a gaping, elastic hole in the Full Faith and Credit
Act, but, rather, a simple factual determination that represents a
statutorily necessary finding as a precondition to according full faith
and credit.
Laurence: While Bob Clinton and I are on opposite sides in much
of the discussion here, I have to agree with him that there's less trouble
to his "court of record" determination than meets the eye. It's not
going to be that difficult, and state courts are already doing it in the
state-to-state situation. Note that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act,39 which allows for the simple registration of judgments
when enforcement is sought in a foreign jurisdiction, only applies to
judgments deserving of full faith and credit. So when a defendant
challenges the registration of a judgment against him, the court may
have to do a full-blown constitutional/statutory full faith and credit
determination, figuring out, for example, whether an Alaska small-
claims court judgment is entitled to recognition under the Act. And
that doesn't seem to cause too many problems.
Ransom: It might be nice if, indeed, we were "transformers" and
could determine for which tribal courts we were going to be trans-
formers based upon various standards and criteria. It might be only
in certain subject matters. The rule wouldn't have to be for every
39. U(NiF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 1, 13 U.L.A. 183 (1964).
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possible judgment. Rather, we could develop standards and criteria
for various tribes to meet, based upon their application in various
subject matters. We could domesticate the tribal judgment in a very
simple procedure in the state court. Then it would be entitled to full
faith and credit because the New Mexico state court determined either
by rule or legislative enactment that it was entitled to enforcement in
the state of New Mexico.
Deloria: There is considerable irony here, beyond that which Ted
has observed. The state of New Mexico makes billions taking tourists
around explaining the Indians to them. Now, the suggestion is that
the state courts will do the same in the legal system as well. In a way
- and I'm not accusing the Chief Justice of having this idea - in a
way what we are considering here is the possibility that the State of
New Mexico will be explaining to the other courts in the country what
tribal courts are all about in this "transformer" theory that we have
developed.
Ransom: Yes. We - the courts of New Mexico - would just be
deciding which courts we are going to recognize in terms of enforce-
ment of judicial decrees about certain subject matters. And then we
would domesticate those orders. Then it's treated like any other judg-
ment or -
Deloria: But part of what is going on is that the New York judge
will be saying, "Gee, I never heard of this tribe before, but New
Mexico says it's okay so .... "
Occhialino: Yes, we're surely talking about some difficult defini-
tional problems any way we look at it. What we're doing is going
through a possible system, deciding where we're going to put that
definitional problem.
Laurence: And let me point out that there is nothing at all voluntary
about the "transformer" theory, at least on the receiving end. If New
Mexico decides to domesticate a tribal court judgment and make it
one of its own, then the New York courts have no choice but to give
full faith and credit to what is now a New Mexico judgment, don't
we all agree on that? On the other hand, if New Mexico determines
merely to enforce the tribal judgment Within the state but without
domesticating it into a state judgment, then there is nothing to which
New York must give full faith and credit. I don't see any in-between
ground.
Clinton: Let's go back to that practical definitional problem. In
light of Chief Justice Ransom's comments about not wanting to have
two trials, that first inquiry is simply asking what is the nature and
structure of the government of a particular tribe. This inquiry allows
us to figure out whether we are dealing with a Western court or not,
which, as I suggested earlier, often is relatively simply discovered -
you can look at their tribal constitution and ordinances. It is not an
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
274 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
inquiry that is any worse than asking whether the tribal court had
subject matter jurisdiction, which we ask all the time. .There is, to my
way of thinking, a big difference between that sort of formal inquiry
into the governing structure of the tribe, which I think is a fairly
simple, formalistic inquiry, and asking whether the judgment that was
rendered is in full procedural compliance within the Indian Civil Rights
Act, which is Bob Laurence's suggestion. Resolving the question of
procedural fairness and compliance with the Indian Civil Rights Act,
I think, does result in exactly the kind of double trial problem to
which Chief Justice Ransom referred in the first instance.
Indeed, one state, South Dakota, has adopted a statute4 that seems
to implement a hybrid arrangement permitting redetermination of tribal
court structures and fairness much like that suggested by Chief Justice
Ransom and Bob Laurence. That statute is incredibly hostile to the
enforcement of tribal judgments, even as a matter of comity. It requires
40. S.D. CODIFID LAWS § 1-1-25 (1992). The statute states:
No order or judgment of a tribal court in the state of South Dakota may
be recognized as a matter of comity in the state courts of South Dakota,
except under the following terms and conditions:
(1) Before a state court may consider recognizing a tribal court order or
judgment the party seeking recognition shall establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that:
(a) The tribal court had jurisdiction over both the subject matter
and the parties;
(b) The order or judgment was not fraudulently obtained;
(c) The order or judgment was obtained by a process that assures
the requisites of an impartial administration of justice including but not
limited to due notice and a hearing;
(d) The order or judgment complies with the laws, ordinances and
regulations of the jurisdiction from which it was obtained; and
(e) The order or judgment does not contravene the public policy of
the state of South Dakota.
(2) If a court is satisfied that all of the foregoing conditions exist, the
court may recognize the tribal court order or judgment in any of the
following circumstances:
(a) In any child custody or domestic relations case; or
(b) In any case in which the jurisdiction issuing the order or judg-
merit also grants comity to orders and judgments of the South Dakota
courts; or
(c) In other cases if exceptional circumstances warrant it; or
(d) Any order required or authorized to be recognized pursuant to
25 U.S.C., § 1911(d) (1988) or 25 U.S.C., § 1919 (1988).
Id. Insofar as this statute imposes special, higher burdens, such as proof by clear and
convincing evidence, that conflict with federal statutory obligations imposed on states
to accord full faith and credit to tribal judgments under with the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988), the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1988), or the Parental Kidnapping Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988), this state statute
might be thought to be invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, para. 2, and to have been preempted by federal law.
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that any party seeking to enforce a tribal judgment in state court
prove by clear and convincing evidence a detailed list of prerequisites
that include but go far beyond the traditional requirement that the
tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
Included in the list is that the tribal order or judgment was not
fraudulently obtained, that the tribal order or judgment was obtained
by a process that assures the requisites of an impartial administration
of justice including but not limited to due notice and a hearing, and,
most remarkably, that the order or judgment complies with the laws,
ordinances and regulations of the tribal jurisdiction from which it was
obtained. This last requirement was no doubt imposed to assure that
state courts could "second guess" tribal courts, even on tribal law, in
order ostensibly to assure their fairness. Nevertheless, it results in
precisely the type of second trial of the underlying dispute, in this
case with a burden imposed on the party that prevailed in the tribal
court to show compliance with tribal substantive and procedural law
by clear and convincing evidence. The extraordinary hostility to the
enforcement of tribal judgments demonstrated by this state statute
dramatically highlights the reason why full faith and credit must be
left to uniform federal law, rather, than case-by-case state initiative,
as suggested by Chief Justice Ransom and as reflected in the South
Dakota statute.
Laurence: Sure, I agree that my system threatens a second trial,
though much narrower than the one contemplated by that South
Dakota statute. But is the solution to tell the tribal court defendant
who alleges that he was given only fifteen minutes to answer following
service of the complaint - an example I admit to being entirely
hypothetical - do we tell that defendant, "Oh, quit complaining and
pay"? Do we really want to deny that defendant a place, outside of
the tribal court, to complain about such a procedure? I can't think
of a surer way to get some federal judge to use the Oliphant4 ax and
to deny the tribal court's power to enter the judgment at all.
Now - pitching asymmetry again - suppose it is the state court
defendant who took default judgment for failure to answer in fifteen
minutes and who is now resisting enforcement of that judgment before
the tribal court. That defendant forsook the federal court system,
which stood ready - theoretically - to protect against such violations
of due process; I wouldn't give a second chance before a tribal court
to challenge the state court procedure.
See? It's not that I think that tribal courts are less fair than state
courts, as Bob Clinton suspects. It's that federal court review is itself
asymmetric, caused partly by the Martinez case. We already have a
system where there is federal review of state court proceedings but not
41. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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tribal court proceedings; my rule of recognition is based, partly, on
this Martinez-induced asymmetry.
Deloria: But what we're buying all over again here is the White
Eagle v. One Feather42 rule that if a tribe is going to have a Western-
style election system, then it has to bring everything else from the
west, including all of the requirements of the United States Constitu-
tion. What if the tribe said, "We want to have a bench, we want to
have a gavel, we want to wear robes. But we also want to have our
traditional mixed into this." Now, Bob, you have designed a system
where somebody is going to sit off the reservation and decide and
make some new determinations that are going to mean a whole lot
economically and socially to people on both sides of the reservation
boundary. Is there an enforcement-of-judgment template that the en-
forcing court has to put over the tribal procedure?
Clinton: I do not think that is correct. I think we are talking basically
about whether you are dealing with some tribunal that classically would
be described as a court of record. That description does not mean
that a court of record cannot infuse tribal tradition into its substantive
law if tribal law can stand it any more than Western courts use the
commercial customs of England under the guise of the common law.
The question is whether the tribunal that rendered the judgment is
basically a Western-style court of record, irrespective of the substantive
law which it applies. Now, certain tribes have chosen not to create
courts of record. They have chosen to vest all of their power into
their tribal council, or their governor, or some other governing insti-
tution. If they choose to do that, there may be contexts in which
federal or state courts may want to afford deference to the adjudicative
decisions of such tribunals. All I am suggesting is the Full Faith and
Credit Act does not require it if the decision was not rendered by a
Westernized tribal court of record.
Occhialino: What if a tribe says it doesn't want a Western style of
court but it does want full faith and credit?
Clinton: It seems to me that the tribe should be aware that if it
chooses to go without the Western-style court, the Full Faith and
Credit Act, and possibly the Parental Kidnapping Act and other like
statutes that accord full faith and credit may uot apply directly to
them. They may have to engage in the kind of government-to-govern-
ment negotiation with Chief Justice Ransom's court or with the leg-
islature of a particular state to get the kind of recognition that they
want. What I want is that tribes which have chosen as an exercise of
their tribal sovereignty to adopt the court of record route, which have
chosen to have a Western-style court route, should get an assurance
that they are entitled to precisely the same full faith and credit and




precisely the same recognition of their judgments that any state has.
Newton: I have changed my mind about four times in the past hour.
If we recommend a tribal-state compact process, then some of these
problems disappear. If a tribe and a state are trying to decide what
to do, the tribal officials inform the state, and vice versa. Their officials
meet together, they talk about the two systems, they then come to an
agreement. They do not have to decide whether the tribe has a Western-
style court or not. I would suspect the objection to this process would
be (1) that the state-tribal compact route is too unwieldy and (2) that
some tribes would not have very much clout in these compact nego-
tiation sessions in some states. And then I guess a third objection
might be that the "transformer" idea is for some reason a bad idea.
But I rather like the notion that New Mexico and a New Mexico tribe
have worked out a relationship regarding the recognition of judgments.
Once New Mexico has enforced a tribal judgment, other states would
have to follow New Mexico's lead because of section 1738.
Clinton: I think the downside to an individual, case-by-case, tribal-
state agreement approach is simply that we are then abandoning federal
legal control of exactly those situations that may need help the most.
What do we do in those places where tribes and states are unable to
come to an agreement?
Laurence: The professors, at least, are in agreement that in those
cases federal, not state, law governs the question of recognition.
Clinton: Also, the logistics of the state-tribal compact route are
difficult. A New Mexico tribe is easily going to be able to negotiate
a compact with the state of New Mexico, we hope. But they may have
to get their judgments enforced in Alaska as well. That is the "trans-
former" trick that Chief Justice Ransom has suggested. Once one
domesticates the tribal court judgment in New Mexico, it becomes a
New Mexico state judgment entitled to full faith and credit. The
problem I have with Chief Justice Ransom's "transformer" solution
is that it really winds up denigrating the sovereignty of the tribes. I
mean, why isn't the tribal judgment entitled to enforcement simply as
a tribal judgment? Why do you have to convert it into a state judgment
to get it enforced? State courts that only enforce the judgments of
other tribes because they have been magically "transformed" into state
judgments quickly and improperly will adopt the view that tribal
sovereignty exists only at the sufferance of and to the extent permitted
by the state in which the reservation is located. The "transformer"
view will transform not only judgments, but our law on inherent
Indian sovereignty. That is a very serious perceptual danger posed by
this electrifying and perhaps shocking "transformer" proposal.
Newton: Well, that was the point of Sam's allusion to the court
going into the tourist guide business. Why is it that a New Mexico
court has to legitimize a tribal court judgment to make it valid?
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Occhialino: Bob and Nell are probably right, but the question is
what do you want to pay? What will the tribes want to pay to get
that last little bit of recognition? My guess is it's not worth the effort.
To have to go -
Deloria: Look, there is a federal statute that requires in very clear
terms "full faith and credit" under the Indian Child Welfare Act 3
and yet there are judges sitting in Connecticut, or wherever, saying
"full" doesn't mean full, "faith" doesn't mean faith, "and" doesn't
mean and, and "credit" doesn't mean credit. I think that certainly
the Navajo tribe would feel much better and would be able to heal
whatever wounds caused to their sovereignty if they could get a nice
piece of' paper signed by Chief Justice Ransom. Every one has heard
of him and if he says - in his official capacity - that tribal judgments
get full faith and credit, that ends the discussion. I think if I were a
tribal chairman, it would be a small enough price to pay.
Newton: One response is to switch the question around and ask
Judge 2"uni about the kinds of problems she would perceive if there
were state court judgments brought to a tribal court, and what kind
of flexibility tribal court judges might prefer to have with reference
to full faith and credit obligations.
Zuni: Well, actually, I have had judgments presented to the tribal
court for enforcement from the New Mexico state court system and
when I was presented with a judgment, the parties were informed to
file a petition seeking enforcement of the state judgment in the tribal
court. No one followed through. So you can see how this goes both
ways.
We've talked a lot about tribal courts needing to get their orders
recognized outside of the tribal court system. It works the other way
around, too. Most of those judgments were judgments for money. I
guess that the tribal court procedure was a sufficient deterrent to these
people to keep them from pursuing the defendant, but it wasn't meant
to be a deterrent at all. I informed the parties of the process to follow
for the tribal court to recognize the state court judgment and I intended
to go through a very simple procedure. But the patties involved in
those cases just simply did not follow through.
Laurence: I think it's important to stress that when Judge Zuni is
deciding whether to enforce a state court judgment and when she holds
a hearing that is not exactly reciprocal or symmetric to those held by
state judges, that's not her denial of, or disrespect for, New Mexico's
sovereignty. It's a denial of sisterhood, that's all. It's her saying that
it's not a symmetric situation. And vice versa. Under my approach to
the problem, when a New York court undertakes an ICRA hearing to




determine whether to enforce a judgment of Judge Zuni's court -
even where it would not, and could not, undertake a similar consti-
tutional hearing when the judgment comes from North Dakota -
that's not per se a denial of Isleta sovereignty. Nor is it a presumption
that hearings before her court are not fair ones. Rather, it's only a
denial of Isleta-New York sisterhood. It's a search for a solution to
an asymmetric problem, and it's a recognition of the fact that there
has been - and can be - no ICRA check on her court outside of
her court system.
I like Justice Ransom's idea of state-tribal compacts that set the
rules on a tribe-by-tribe, state-by-state basis. And, while I appreciate
the irony that Sam has observed, I also like the practicality of the
transformer theory.
In spite of the respect that I have for state and tribal judges, I think
the background rule should be a federal rule of recognition. But I
think that states and tribes should be able to opt out by entering into
Justice Ransom's compacts. It may bother some that a state and tribe
together can opt out of a federal rule. It should bother them less when
they discover that the Bankruptcy Code has a similar statutory pro-
cedure. There Congress has enacted a uniform rule - an exemption
law, actually - and then allowed states to opt out from the otherwise
uniform national rule."4 And I think that the tribes and states acting
together should be able to opt out of any uniform national enforce-
ment-of-judgment system.
And it just occurs to me to mention - speaking of exemption laws
and their widespread non-uniformity among the states - that we are
speaking here of the recognition of judgments and their general en-
forceability. The actual property against which a judgment may be
enforced will vary according to the enforcing jurisdiction; states are
quite reluctant to use other states' exemption rules. So, both Florida
and Navajo prohibit the garnishment of wages and that rule will obtain
in those jurisdictions, irrespective of whether a foreign judgment is
"recognized." Of course, the exemption laws themselves are subject
to negotiated agreements between states and tribes.
Deloria: Bob Laurence's comment about exemption law has made
me realize that we have not, I think, done a good job of distinguishing
three related, yet clearly distinguishable issues:
(1) One government's recognition of another government's sover-
eignty;
(2) One government's recognition of that particular exercise of the
other government's sovereignty that is called "entry of judgment";
(3) One government's agreement that a certain judgment will be
enforced with that government's help against certain property lying
within that government's jurisdiction.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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I have always understood that difference - in my view, the crucial
difference - between (1) and (2). Furthermore, I have always under-
stood that (1) does not require (2). Nell's discourse on comity shows
that: New Mexico recognizes France's sovereignty, even though it may
decline in certain instances to enforce a French judgment. Likewise,
Seminole recognition of Florida's sovereignty does not necessarily
require it to recognize every state judgment brought to a Seminole
court, putting aside for a moment Bob Clinton's argument that section
1738 is a statutory requirement that it do so.
Now, Bob Laurence, are you telling us that (2) does not require
(3)?
Laurence: That's right, (2) does not necessarily lead to (3). Exemp-
tion laws are thought everywhere to be matters of intimate local
concern. That's why Congress was persuaded to allow the states to
"opt out" of a unified bankruptcy exemption scheme, as I mentioned
above. 45 That's why most states did opt out.46 That's why the Uniform
Exemptions Act has suffered such an unfriendly reception.47 And that's
why, even in the state-to-state full faith and credit regime, states almost
always use their own exemption laws, when they are required to
recognize another state's judgment. 4 Arkansas may have to give "full
faith and credit" to an Oklahoma judgment, but it doesn't have to
allow it to be enforced against an Arkansas homestead, even if that
homestead would not be protected if it were in Oklahoma. 49 Nor does
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
46. See Co .mi oN BAKRuIPTcy § 522.02 n.4a (15th ed. 1979).
47. See UNIF. ExamPTioNs AcT, 13 U.L.A. 207 (1979). Only Alaska has enacted
this uniform act, and that adoption was with substantial amendment.
48. See LEmiAR ET AL., supra note 31, § 122, at 335 & n. 12 (4th ed. 1986) (citing
Marine Midland Bank v. Surfbelt, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Garrett v.
Garrett, 490 P.2d 313 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Person v. Williams Echols Dry Goods
Co., 169 S.W. 223 (1914); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710
(1899)) ("The effect of these cases, as to exemptions, is that only the exemption laws
of the forum are applicable, those of the place where the cause of action arose being
irrelevant."). But see id. § 122, at 336 n.13 ("There is some authority for reference to
the exemption laws of the state where the debt was incurred"); id. § 50, at 160 ("One
of the most common types of cases in which injunctions are granted against maintenance
of foreign suits is that in which an extra-state garnishment suit is brought to reach a
claim that under the local law is exempt from garnishment.").
49. Id. at 335. The authors state:
The availability of attachment and garnishment, the mode of levying
execution and rules establishing exemptions therefrom, are usually held to
be procedural [and therefore the enforcing state will apply its own law],
even though they obviously have a very significant effect upon the practical
valus of substantive rights that may be reduced to judgment. Apart from
the considerations of convenience which normally support reliance upon
local procedural rules, exemption rules are often backed also by local
public policies which may be supported by an affirmative governmental
interest of the forum state.
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it have to follow Oklahoma exemption law.o
Deloria: A variety of vehicles have been used in the state-tribal
relations context, varying from fairly formally structured written agree-
ments to simply one government announcing that it was going to
conduct its business in a certain way and the other government an-
nouncing that it was going to conduct its business in a certain way
and they happened to have talked about it before hand and these
methods fit together. How much formality would be needed here?
Certainly if I were a tribal judge, I would want to have pretty good
political grounding under me before I sat down and started making
agreements with state officials. Chief Justice, you probably have more
flexibility. Would you think it would have to be a formal agreement
with each tribe or would you simply announce your criteria and then
come what may, see how tribes responded?
Ransom: Well, based upon the idea that comity is a judicially created
doctrine, it seems to me that the supreme court would have the power
to make rules that would avoid the necessity of a mini-trial or a
collateral trial on the question of recognition in every case. What I
envisioned was a task force of representatives of the tribes and the
trial courts, with perhaps some representatives from the legislature, to
study the question of whether there are particular subject matters that
are common to all the tribes that the state should recognize. And there
are these questions of reciprocity. There are, perhaps, some tribal
courts that are so Westernized, so to speak, that we would recognize
everything that comes from those courts. But I would say that's an
area of negotiation, and I would hope that no small tribe or small
pueblo would get left in the lurch. But it would be a common effort
to arrive at, as I called them, standards or criteria for recognition.
Deloria: Here is how it would work: You would have developed
your standards - whatever they might be - and published them.
Then you would not need to have a written agreement with tribal
courts or tribal governments. You would simply have the standards,
and then anyone presenting a tribal court order from a tribe that met
those criteria, you would recognize the order. Right?
Ransom: Well yes, if by "you" you mean that the state trial court
- not the supreme court - would recognize the order. Now, I
wouldn't necessarily expect that for the trial judge to enter that order,
each tribe would have to have its own rules that were complementary
to ours, because if the system doesn't work from our perspective, we
can revoke the rules.
You know, this idea about reciprocity doesn't bother me so much.
I would rather see how it develops. My guess is that with a sense of
50. Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 169 S.W. 223 (Ark. 1914).
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cooperation, everybody would be happy. But if not, we may find that
we're going to have to amend the rules somehow.
I wouldn't want to get involved in requiring the tribes to have
complementary rules of court procedure or recognition. I would hope
they would do so, but I would not like to have it as a sine qua non
of recognition.
Deloria: Well, our time is about up. Do we have a summary?
Occhialino: We have found surprising agreement that there has to
be flexibility. Even Bob Clinton, who started off by telling us that it
was a simple matter of a federal statute mandating full faith and
credit, has given us a few holes that we could drive a big truck
through. Bob Laurence says that it should be asymmetric. Chief Justice
Ransom says it could be even unilateral, perhaps, as an experiment to
see how it will work. And I think that Judge Zuni and Professor
Newton have both agreed that they don't see anything mandatory and
compulsory and universal that has to be applied. There's a lot of
flexibility, a lot of hope for good faith solutions that don't require a
federal statute. What we rejected seems to be a simple equivalence of
state and tribal governments as being exactly the same. The one area
where there's disagreement, however, is whether the matter should be
orchestrated at the state and tribal level or whether the matter should
be handled by a more uniform federal approach. That's an important
question.
Deloria: That is an important question. Something that I do have
a half-way informed opinion about is that if the federal government
gets into it, they will inevitably complicate it. Nobody is going to be
happy with the solution and they will assign the job of coming up
with a new solution to somebody who can't do anything else right,
either. Whereas, if the states and the tribes can work this out, then
they control what they are committing to. As Chief Justice Ransom
says, they can pull back if something is not working and wait a little
while and try it again.
Then, the question is still how do we get it going or are we only
going to be working at the highest level - with the greatest common
denominator, if you will. I think the answer is the same as we have
seen in other areas of state-tribal relations. There is a normative impact
of states seeing other states working this out. Tribes seeing other tribes
benefitting from it are inclined to say, "Now that we understand the
structure, we will try it, too." And then the later tribes will do a
better job than the first ones did. There may be some places that will
not try it. But, I think the normative impact of somebody priming
the pump is going to solve a lot of that.
Zuni: [ guess I would say a solution to this certainly would be to
the benefit of both Indian tribes and Indian people, as well as those
people who are seeking to enforce judgments within tribal jurisdictions.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/8
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Laurence: One last thought on the tribal-state negotiations. We
should hope, I think, that these negotiations are able to continue
outside of the kind of high profile case that hits the front page of the
Journal. An emphatic refusal by one jurisdiction or another to come
to the aid of a worthy plaintiff in a sympathetic case could take the
discussion out of the quiet setting where composed leaders negotiate
and put it into a forum where political posturing becomes important
and level heads do not always prevail. It seems to me if we can get
these negotiations under way in a calm atmosphere, under the boring
title of "full faith and credit" and avoid the impact such a high-
profile case could bring, we're very lucky. What we want to avoid
here is a headline that says, "TRIBE TO WIDOW: DROP DEAD."
Deloria: Well, I want to thank everybody for appearing. I hope that
it will be useful to someone, somewhere. Time to bring up the Bran-
denburg Concerto ....
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